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Summary. Following devolution, differences developed between UK countries in systems of
measuring performance against a common target that ambulance services ought to respond
to 75% of calls for what may be immediately life threatening emergencies (category A calls)
within 8 minutes. Only in England was this target integral to a ranking system of ‘star rating’,
which inﬂicted reputational damage on services that failed to hit targets, and only in England
has this target been met. In other countries, the target has been missed by such large margins
that services would have been publicly reported as failing, if they had been covered by the
English system of star ratings. The paper argues that this case-study adds to evidence from
comparisons of different systems of hospital performance measurement that, to have an effect,
these systems need to be designed to inﬂict reputational damage on those that have performed
poorly; and it explores implications of this hypothesis.The paper also asks questions about the
adequacy of systems of performance measurement of ambulance services in UK countries.
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1. Introduction
Kelman (2006), in his review of Ferlie et al. (2005), was critical of its neglect of the uncomfort-
able fact that ‘Government does not perform as well as it should’. This uncomfortable fact is
a product of unfavourable comparisons, in terms of dynamism and responsiveness, of services
operating within government and normal markets (subject to well-known conditions) (Wolf,
1993). Indeed this contrast by Schulze (1977), pages 70–71, was cited by Enthoven (1985), page
10, in his argument for the introduction of an internal market for the National Health Service
(NHS), to enable it to escape from its gridlocked form of the 1980s. As Wolf (1993) has argued,
however, the reasons for the predominant and ineluctable source for failures of government
services lie precisely in those circumstances that provide the rationale for these services being
outsidenormalmarkets.Schulze(1977)highlightedthatexitbyfailingproviderswasanintrinsic
characteristic of the dynamism of normal markets. One reason why the Thatcher government’s
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attempt to create appropriate incentives in the NHS, through the creation of an internal mar-
ket, foundered was that Ministers could not allow exit by failing providers, as Ministers were
responsible for ensuring good access to local services (Enthoven, 1999; Tuohy, 1999; Secretary
of State for Health, 2000; Bevan and Robinson, 2005). So the ‘internal market’ evolved into one
like the caucus race in Alice in Wonderland, in which ‘everyone must have prizes’ (Royce (1995)
and Carroll (1975), page 49). Such difﬁculties illustrate why Kelman (2006) emphasized that a
primary research concern of those studying public services ought to be tackling their under-
performance. That concern is the subject of this paper: how can governments use performance
measurement to put pressures on providers of public services that are analogous to those that
normal markets put on private providers?
As Le Grand (2003), page 5, pointed out, in the post-war British welfare state, until the elec-
tion of the Thatcher government in 1979, there was minimal interest in the design of external
systemstoimprovetheperformanceofprovidersofpublicservices.Thiswasbecausetheguiding
principle was the Panglossian assumption that all the key players were ‘knights’:
‘professionals ... were concerned only with the interests of the people they were serving ... politicians,
civil servants, state bureaucrats, and managers were supposed accurately to divine social and individual
needs in the areas concerned, to be motivated to meet those needs and hence operate services that did
the best possible job from the resources available’.
This assumption explains why the shocking series of scandals in the NHS that came to light in
England in 1998 went on for far too long (Smith, 1998; Abbasi, 1998; Bevan, 2008b) and is the
only justiﬁcation for the conventional British response to failure to deliver, namely rewarding
failing organizations with extra resources. Following the Labour Government’s policy of devol-
ution (Greer, 2004), different systems of using performance measurement developed from 1998
within the countries of the UK. The Panglossian assumption that all key players in the NHS
were knights continued as a guiding principle for the governments in Wales and Scotland; the
government in England, however, sought, in 2000, to change the culture of the NHS from one
that ‘bails out failure to one where it rewards success’ (Secretary of State for Health (2000),
page 28), through the radical and controversial system of performance measurement by annual
‘star ratings’ of NHS organizations (known as ‘trusts’). Whereas the ‘internal market’ was
designed to put ﬁnancial pressure on failing providers in a way that threatened services for local
populations, the star rating system was designed directly to put pressure only on those running
failing providers to improve performance for local populations.
Star ratings were ﬁrst applied in 2001 to acute trusts (Secretary of State for Health, 2001)
and then extended to cover ambulance trusts in 2002 (Secretary of State for Health, 2002), and
all types of trusts from 2003 until 2005, the ﬁnal year of star ratings (Commission for Health
Improvement, 2003a,b; Healthcare Commission, 2004, 2005a). This process gave each trust a
score from zero to three stars based on performance against a small number of ‘key targets’ and
a larger set of targets and indicators in a ‘balanced scorecard’. Trusts that failed against key
targets, and were ‘zero rated’, were ‘named and shamed’ as ‘failing’, and their chief executives
were at risk of losing their jobs. Trusts that performed well on both the key targets and the
balanced scorecard, and achieved the highest rating of three stars, were rewarded by being pub-
licly celebrated for being ‘high performing’ and granted ‘earned autonomy’ (Bevan and Hood,
2006a,b).
This paper examines the effects of the various systems of performance measurement in the
countries of the UK for a common target for ambulance trusts, that 75% of emergency calls
(made by someone telephoning 999), that may be immediately life threatening (category A),
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was to be achieved in 2001 in England and Wales, and 4 and 6 years later in Northern Ireland
and Scotland. The second main section of this paper gives contextual background by
outlining a typology of systems of performance measurement, proposing a hypothesis of four
requisite characteristics for a system to have had an effect and testing this through compar-
isons of different systems of hospital performance measurement, and outlining criticisms of
the star rating system. The third main section of this paper describes the effects of various
systems of performance measurement of ambulance response times in the UK. It outlines the
development of targets for response times, describes the effects of star ratings on reported
performance against these targets by different trusts in England and compares reported per-
formance against the category A 8-minute target by different UK countries. That section also
considers the basis and adequacy of target selection, deﬁnition and measurement, evidence
of gaming in England (including detailed examination from analysis by one of us (RH)
following concerns that were raised in the course of clinical governance reviews by the
Commission for Health Improvement (CHI) of ambulance trusts). The paper concludes by
raising disturbing questions for governments in the various UK countries from our study of
targets for ambulance response times, considering recommendations on the development of,
and research into, systems of performance measurement by a working party of the Royal
Statistical Society in response to the Blair government’s emphasis on these systems (Bird
et al., 2005).
2. Types and effects of different systems of performance measurement
2.1. A typology of performance measurement
Hood (2007) has described three types of systems of performance measurement: as general
intelligence; in relation to targets; with measures being aggregated so that organizations can be
ranked. This section considers the development of each type and its application to health care.
Intelligence systems have a long history in health care, going back to the publication of Flor-
ence Nightingale’s analyses of hospital mortality rates (Nightingale, 1863). Since the 1990s,
following the technological advances in computing and Web sites, there has been an explosion
in the development of intelligence systems publishing clinical outcome indicators, but without
resolving the problems that were identiﬁed in Florence Nightingale’s analyses. Spiegelhalter
(1999) pointed out that she clearly foresaw the three major problems that were cited in a sur-
vey of the publication of surgical mortality rates that were identiﬁed by Schneider and Epstein
(1996) about 130 years later:
‘the inadequate control for the type of patient, data manipulation and the use of a single outcome
measure such as mortality’.
Iezzoni(1996)pointedoutthatissuesraisedinthedebatefollowingpublicationofNightingale’s
hospital mortality rates echo those which are cited frequently about contemporary efforts at
measuring provider performance. These included problems of data quality, measurement (risk
adjustment and the need to examine mortality 30 days after admission rather than in-hospital
deaths), gaming (providers avoiding high risk patients because of fears of public exposure) and
the public’s ability to understand this information. These unresolved problems mean that there
was, in the 1990s, intense and polarized debate about the beneﬁts of publication of information
on hospital performance, with different camps describing this as essential, desirable, inevitable
and potentially dangerous (Marshall, Shekelle, Brook and Leatherman, 2000).
Although the use of targets also has a long history (Barber, 2007; Hood, 2007), Hood iden-
tiﬁed New Zealand as pioneering the comprehensive introduction of a system of target setting164 G. Bevan and R. Hamblin
across government in the 1980s. This offered a model for the Blair government which, follow-
ing its election in 1997, introduced the systematic setting of public service agreement targets,
as part of an implicit contract between Her Majesty’s Treasury and spending departments for
theirbudgetsforpublicservices(James,2004).(ItwasduringthisperiodthatbothEnglandand
Wales introduced the category A 8-minute target for ambulance trusts.)
The Thatcher government in the 1990s (before devolution) introduced the ranking system of
league tables of performance of schools in terms of examination results, across the countries of
the UK (West and Pennell, 2000; Department for Education and Skills, 2004). Hood (2007) has
argued that what was distinctive and novel in the Blairite approach to performance measure-
ment of public services was the development of government-mandated ranking systems. The
differences between approaches to performance measurement in the UK are illustrated by the
decisions, following devolution, of the government in England to maintain the publication of
school league tables, and the governments in Wales and Scotland to abandon their publication
(Hood, 2007). Bird et al. (2005) observed that school league tables are published in some states
in the USA (California and Texas), but there has been legislation against their publication in
New South Wales in Australia and the Republic of Ireland. For the NHS in each country, the
government in England introduced the ranking system of star ratings, but the governments in
WalesandScotland,intheirdevelopmentsofperformancemeasurement,deliberatelyeschewed
these being published as ranking systems.
2.2. Comparisons of systems of hospital performance measurement
Using resources for performance measurement, rather than delivery, of health care can only be
justiﬁed if the former has an inﬂuence on the latter: there is little justiﬁcation on grounds of
transparency alone if this has no effect. Spiegelhalter (1999) highlighted criticism by Codman
(1917) of the ritual publication of hospital reports that gave details of morbidity tables and
lists of operations which were intended to ‘impress the organisations and subscribers’ but were
‘not used by anybody’. The ﬁrst systematic review of evaluations of systems of performance
measurement, by Marshall, Shekelle, Brook and Leatherman (2000) and Marshall, Shekelle,
Leatherman and Brook (2000) commented on the contrast between the scale of this activity
and the lack of rigorous evaluation of its effects. A recent systematic review (Fung et al., 2008)
made the same point, emphasizing that the studies they had identiﬁed still focused on the same
seven systems that had been examined by Marshall, Shekelle, Brook and Leatherman (2000); in
particular on the cardiac surgery reporting system (CSRS) of New York State Department of
Health. These systematic reviews produced evidence that enables us to examine three pathways
through which performance measurement might result in improved performance. The ﬁrst two
ofthese,thechangeandselectionpathways,wereproposedbyBerwicketal.(2003)andusedby
Fung et al. (2008). The change pathway assumes that providers are knights: that simply iden-
tifying scope for improvement leads to action, without there being any need for any incentive
other than the provider’s innate altruism and professionalism; thus, there is no need to make
the results of the information available beyond the provider themselves. As Hibbard (2008)
observed, the evidence suggests that this is a relatively weak stimulus to action. This ﬁnding
was anticipated by Florence Nightingale in the 1850s in seeking to convey the urgent need to
the government to improve the living conditions of army barracks in peacetime: her statistical
analysis showed that these conditions were so appalling that the outcome was that, on the basis
of comparisons of mortality rates with the civilian population outside,
‘1,500 soldiers good soldiers are as certainly killed by these neglects yearly as if they were drawn up on
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She continually reminded herself that ‘reports are not self executive’ (Woodham-Smith (1970),
pages 229–230). The selection pathway assumes that providers respond to the threat of
patients as consumers using information in selecting providers, but, systematic reviews by
Marshall, Shekelle, Brook and Leatherman (2000) and Marshall, Shekelle, Leatherman and
Brook (2000) and Fung et al. (2008) found that patients did not respond as consumers in this
way. In presenting the ﬁndings from that latest systematic review, at a seminar in January 2008,
at the Health Foundation in London, Paul Shekelle observed that many of these studies were in
the USA and showed that patients there did not use this information as consumers and, if that
responsehasnotmaterializedintheUSA,withitsemphasisonmarkets,thenitishighlyunlikely
to be observed in other countries.
The systematic review of the evidence of effects of performance measurement systems by
Fung et al. (2008) suggests that neither of the two pathways that were proposed by Berwick
et al. (2003) for these systems to have an inﬂuence is effective. Hibbard (2008) has argued,
however, that a third pathway of designing performance measurement that is directed at rep-
utations can be a powerful driver of improvement. She has led research for over a decade
into the requisite characteristics for a system of performance measurement to have an effect
(see, for example, Hibbard et al. (1996, 1997, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2005a,b, 2007), Hibbard and
Jewett (1997), Hibbard and Pawlson (2004) and Peters et al. (2007)). Hibbard et al. (2002)
showed, in a controlled laboratory study, that comparative performance data were more likely
to be used, if they were presented in a ranking system that made it easy to discern the high
and low performers. Hibbard et al. (2003) proposed the hypothesis that, for a system of per-
formance measurement to have an effect, it needs to satisfy four requisite characteristics: it
must be
(a) a ranking system,
(b) published and widely disseminated,
(c) easily understood by the public (so that they can see which providers are performing well
and poorly) and
(d) followed up by future reports (that show whether performance has improved or not).
Hibbard et al. (2003, 2005b) tested this hypothesis in a controlled experiment, based on a
report, which ranked performance of 24 hospitals, in south central Wisconsin, in terms of qual-
ity of care. This report used two summary indices of adverse events (deaths and complications):
within broad categories of surgery and non-surgery; across three areas of care (cardiac, mater-
nity, and hip and knee). The report showed material variation (unlike insigniﬁcant differences
in ranking in league tables) and highlighted hospitals with poor scores in maternity (eight) and
cardiac care (three). The effects of reporting were assessed across three sets of hospitals: public
report, private report and no report. For the public report set, a concerted effort was made to
disseminate the report widely to the public: the report was available on a Web site; copies were
inserted into the local newspaper, distributed by community groups and at libraries; the report
attractedpresscoverageandgeneratedsubstantialpublicinterest.Fortheprivatereportset,the
report was supplied to managers only; the no-report set was not supplied with the report. This
research design enables comparisons of the effects of the three pathways. If the change pathway
werepowerful,thenthereoughttobenodifferencebetweenthepublicreportandprivatereport
hospitals, but the public report set made signiﬁcantly greater efforts to improve quality than
the other two sets (Hibbard et al., 2003, 2005b). The managers of hospitals in the public report
set hospitals discounted the importance of the selection pathway: they did not see the report as
affecting their market share (Hibbard et al., 2003). Later analysis showed that these managers
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‘There were no signiﬁcant changes in market share among the hospitals in the public report from the
pretothepostperiod... noshiftsawayfromlow-ratedhospitalsandnoshiftstowardhigher-ratedhos-
pitals in overall discharges or in obstetric or cardiac care cases during any of the examined post-report
time periods’
(Hibbard et al., 2005b). The reputation pathway, however, was crucial: the managers of hos-
pitals that had been shown to have been performing poorly in the public report group took
action, because of their concerns over the effects of the report on their hospitals’ reputations.
Wenowundertaketwofurthertestsofthehypothesisthat,forasystemofperformancemeasure-
ment to have an effect, this needs to be via the reputation pathway, through two comparisons
of two hospital performance measurement systems, with reference to Hibbard’s four requisite
characteristics.
The ﬁrst comparison is between two systems of reporting clinical outcome indicators. One
is the much-studied CSRS of New York State Department of Health, which began in 1989 as
the ﬁrst statewide programme to produce public data on risk-adjusted death rates following
coronary artery bypass graft surgery, and is the longest-running programme in the USA of this
kind (Chassin, 2002). The other is the annual reports from the Clinical Resource and Audit
Group (CRAG) in Scotland, which when these began in 1984 were at the forefront in Europe
of public disclosure of such information (Mannion and Goddard, 2001; Clinical Resources and
Audit Group, 2002).
The CSRS produces annual reports of observed, expected and risk-adjusted in-hospital
30-day mortality rates, by hospital and surgeon. Green and Wintﬁeld (1995) observed
‘CSRS became the ﬁrst proﬁling system with sufﬁcient clinical detail to generate credible comparisons
of providers’ outcomes. For this reason, CSRS has been recognized by many states and purchasers of
care as the gold standard among systems of its kind.’
The CSRS satisﬁed three of the above four requisite characteristics: these annual reports are
published and widely disseminated, although performance is not ranked, statistical outliers are
identiﬁed (New York State Department of Health, 2006). The CSRS was used by hospitals and
had an inﬂuence. There is controversy over the beneﬁts from the dramatic improvements in
reported performance: Chassin (2002) observed that
‘By 1992 New York had the lowest risk-adjusted mortality rate of any state in the nation and the most
rapid rate of decline of any state with below-average mortality’;
Dranove et al. (2003) found, however, that such
‘mandatory reporting mechanisms inevitably give providers the incentive to decline to treat more difﬁ-
cult and complicated patients’.
Whatisofparticularinteresthereisthat,intheaccountbyChassin(2002)ofhowfourhospitals
went about the tasks of improvement, he emphasized that the selection and change pathways
had no effect. The key driver of change was the reputation pathway through adverse publicity
from the CSRS identifying outlier hospitals performing poorly (Chassin, 2002):
‘Market forces played no role. Managed care companies did not use the data in any way to reward
better performing hospitals or to drive patients toward them. Nor did patients avoid high-mortality
hospitals or seek out those with low mortality ... the impetus to use the data to improve has been
limited almost entirely to hospitals that have been named as outliers with poor performance ... hos-
pitals not faced with the opprobrium attached to being named as poorly performing outliers have
largely failed to use the rich performance data to ﬁnd ways to lift themselves from mediocrity to
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The CRAG’s reports aimed to provide a benchmarking service for clinical staff by publishing
comparative clinical outcome indicators across Scotland. The ﬁnal report for 2002 (Clinical
Resource and Audit Group, 2002) included two kinds of hospital clinical indicators (that used
the only data the NHS collected routinely on outcomes following discharge from hospital):
emergency readmission rates (for medical and surgical patients); mortality (or survival) after
hospital treatment (for hip fracture, acute myocardial infarction, stroke and selected elective
surgery).TheCRAGreportsessentiallyassumedachangepathwayasthemeansthroughwhich
the information that they produced would be used. These reports, which began before, and
continued after, the internal market was introduced, were explicitly designed not to damage
hospitals’reputations:thelastCRAGreport(ClinicalResourceandAuditGroup(2002),page2)
emphasizedthatitsinformationdidnot‘constitutea“leaguetable”ofperformance’.TheCRAG
reportswereevaluatedbyaCRAG-fundedClinicalIndicatorsSupportTeam(ClinicalResource
and Audit Group (2002), pages 223–229) and Mannion and Goddard (2001, 2003). Despite the
enormous effort that went into the production of these statistics, these evaluations found that
they lacked credibility, because of the familiar problems of poor quality of data and inadequate
adjustment for variation in casemix. These evaluations also found that the reports were difﬁ-
cult to interpret, lacked publicity and were not widely disseminated. Hence these reports did
not satisfy Hibbard’s four requisite characteristics. The two evaluations found that they had
little inﬂuence: Mannion and Goddard (2003) found that these data were rarely used by staff in
hospitals and the boards to which the hospitals were accountable, and general practitioners in
discussions with patients.
The second comparison is a natural experiment between a ranking system, the star rating
system in England, which was dominated by performance against targets for waiting times, and
target systems for waiting times in Wales and Scotland, neither of which were part of ranking
systems.
The star rating system in England satisﬁed Hibbard’s four requisite characteristics and was
designed to inﬂict reputational damage on hospitals performing poorly. Ranking through
annual star rating was easy to understand, and the results were widely disseminated: they were
published in the national and local newspapers and on Web sites, and featured in national and
local television. Mannion et al. (2005a) emphasized that the star rating system stood out from
most other systems of performance measurement in that hospital staff seemed to be highly en-
gaged with information that was used in star ratings. They attributed this to ‘the effectiveness
of the communication and dissemination strategy’ and ‘the comprehensibility and appeal of
such a stark and simple way of presenting the data’. Star ratings obviously mattered for chief
executives, as being zero rated resulted in damage to their reputations and threats to their jobs.
In the ﬁrst year (2001), the 12 zero-rated hospitals were described by the then Secretary of
State for Health as the ‘dirty dozen’; six of their chief executives lost their jobs (Department
of Health, 2002a). In the fourth year, the chief executives of the nine acute hospitals that were
zero rated, were ‘named and shamed’ by the Sun (on October 21st, 2004), the newspaper with
a circulation of over 3 million in Britain: a two-page spread had the heading ‘You make us
sick! Scandal of Bosses running Britain’s worst hospitals’ and claimed that they were deliver-
ing ‘squalid wards, long waiting times for treatment and rock-bottom staff morale’; a leader
claimed that if they had been working in the private sector they would have ‘been sacked long
ago’ (Whitﬁeld, 2004). Mannion et al. (2005a) highlighted the pervasive nature of the damage
to reputations that is caused by poor scores in star ratings on hospital staff. For one hospi-
tal, the effect of having been zero rated was described as having been ‘devastating’, ‘hit right
down to the workforce—whereas bad reports usually hit senior management upwards’, and
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‘Nurses demanding changing rooms because they didn’t want to go outside [in uniform] because they
were being accosted in the streets’.
Those from a one-star hospital described this as making people ‘who are currently employed
here feel that they are working for a third class organisation’. More generally, star ratings were
reported to affect recruitment of staff:
‘a high performance rating was “attractive” in that it signalled to potential recruits the impression that
the trust was a “good” organisation to work for. In contrast, “low” performing trusts reported that a
poor star rating contributed to their problems as many health professionals would be reluctant to join
an organisation that had been publicly classiﬁed as under-performing.’
InWalesandScotland,thetargetsystemsforlongwaitingtimesreliedonthechangepathway:
that hospitals would know how their performance compared with targets set by government,
and this alone would be enough to drive improvement. In each country there was neither sys-
tematic reporting to the public that ranked hospitals’ performance in a form analogous to star
ratings, nor clarity in published information on waiting times: in Wales, breaches to targets
were tolerated but not publicized (Auditor General for Wales (2005a), page 36); in Scotland,
large numbers of patients actually waiting for treatment were excluded from published statis-
tics (Auditor General for Scotland, 2001; Propper et al., 2008). Each government’s system of
performance measurement lacked clarity in the priority of the various targets. In Wales, there
was confusion over the relative priority of the various targets in the Service and Financial
Frameworkandthegovernment’stargetsforwaitingtimes‘notalways[having]beenclearlyand
consistently articulated or subject to clear and speciﬁc timescales’ (Auditor General for Wales
(2005a),pages36and41).InScotland,theperformanceassessmentframeworkwascriticizedfor
being‘overlycomplexandinaccessible’forthepublicandthoseworkingintheNHS(Farraretal.
(2004),pages17–18).Bothgovernmentscontinuedtorewardfailure.InWalestherewere‘neither
strong incentives nor sanctions to improve waiting time performance’, and the perception was
that
‘the current waiting time performance management regime effectively “rewarded failure” to deliver
waiting time targets’
(Auditor General for Wales (2005a), pages 42 and 40). In Scotland, there was the perception of
‘perverse incentives ... where “failing” Boards are “bailed out” with extra cash and those managing
their ﬁnances well are not incentivised’
(Farrar et al. (2004), pages 20–21 and 4).
ThenaturalexperimentbetweenstarratingsinEngland,thatsatisﬁedtheabovefourrequisite
characteristics, and the target systems in Wales and Scotland, that did not, has been subject
to several studies to examine their effects on performance in waiting times, both over time
and across countries at the national level: for England, Scotland and Wales (Bevan and Hood,
2006b; Auditor General for Wales, 2005a); for England and Wales (Bevan, 2008a); a detailed
econometric analysis, for England and Scotland (Propper et al., 2008). These comparisons have
shown dramatic improvements in performance in England; initial deterioration in Wales and
Scotland, and performance in England continuing to outstrip that of the other countries.
Another cross-national comparison, by Willcox et al. (2007), of different countries’ attempts to
tackle the problem of waiting times, compared Australia, Canada, England, New Zealand and
Wales over the 6-year period 2000–2005. They summarized their ﬁnding as
‘Of the ﬁve countries, England has achieved the most sustained improvement, linked to major funding
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(Willcox et al., 2007). There is a question of the extent to which the effects of the English system
were due not only to their capacity to inﬂict reputational damage but also to the threats to the
jobs of chief executives. This requires further research.
These various comparisons suggest that hospital performance measurement systems that sat-
isfy Judith Hibbard’s four requisite characteristics, in terms of their capacity to inﬂict damage
onthereputationsofhospitalsperformingpoorly,hadsigniﬁcanteffects,whereasthosesystems
that lacked that capacity had little or no effect. The importance of reputational damage as a
key driver of change was also identiﬁed by Mannion and Davies (2002) in their interviews with
expertsintheUSAinreportinghealthcareperformance:wherereportsofperformancedidhave
an effect, the underlying incentives were perceived to be, not ﬁnancial, but ‘softer issues such as
reputation, status and professional pride’. Hence Mannion and Davies highlighted the power
ofsystemsof‘namingandshaming’andthatpublicreportingmattered,whetherornotthiswas
used by consumers, because ‘it makes providers pay more attention because they don’t want to
look bad’. Mannion and Goddard (2003) also emphasized that the US evidence is that public
reportinghasanimpact‘particularlywheretheorganizationisidentiﬁedasperformingpoorly’.
Florence Nightingale well understood reputational damage as a means of putting pressure on
governmenttotakeaction:shecoinedthebattle-cryofthoseseekingreformsinthesanitarycon-
ditions of the peacetime army: ‘Our soldiers enlist to death in the barracks’ (Woodham-Smith
(1970), page 229).
2.3. Criticisms of star ratings
The star rating system has been examined by the House of Commons Public Administration
Select Committee (2003) and as part of the examination of systems of performance measure-
ment by a working party of the Royal Statistical Society (Bird et al., 2005). National auditors
have examined responses to targets for hospital waiting times in England (National Audit
Ofﬁce, 2001a,b, 2004; Audit Commission, 2003), Wales (Auditor General for Wales, 2005a,
b) and Scotland (Auditor General for Scotland, 2001, 2006a); responses to targets for ambu-
lance response times in Scotland (National Audit Ofﬁce, 1999; Auditor General for Scotland,
2006b), Wales (Auditor General for Wales, 2006) and England (Audit Commission, 2007). The
CHI has published a detailed commentary on its star rating of the NHS in 2003 (Commission
forHealthImprovement,2004a);italsoreportedonconcernsoverthewaythattrustsresponded
to targets for hospital waiting times (Commission for Health Improvement, 2004b) and ambu-
lance response times (Commission for Health Improvement, 2003c), which were identiﬁed in
the course of inspections of the implementation of the systems and processes of clinical gover-
nance in each NHS organization. There is already a substantial scholarly literature on the star
rating system: Alvarez-Rosete et al. (2005), Bevan (2006, 2008a), Bevan and Cornwell (2006),
Bevan and Hood (2004, 2006a,b), Brown and Lilford (2006), Burgess et al. (2003), De Bruijn
(2007), Friedman and Kelman (2007), Hauck and Street (2007), Heath and Radcliffe (2007),
Hood (2006, 2007), Jacobs et al. (2006), Jacobs and Goddard (2007), Jacobs and Smith (2004),
Kelman and Friedman (2007), Klein (2002), Mannion et al. (2005a,b,c), Mannion and
Goddard (2002), Marshall et al. (2003), Mays (2006), Patel et al. (2008), Propper et al. (2008),
Rowan et al. (2004), Smith (2002, 2005), Snelling (2003), Spiegelhalter (2005a), Stevens (2004),
Stevens et al. (2006), Sutherland and Leatherman (2006) and Willcox et al. (2007). Some of this
literature has shown reported performance improving in England against the most important
targets. All the criticisms of star ratings recognize its undeniable effect, but have also identiﬁed
six signiﬁcant general problems: in measuring what matters, selection of targets, nature of mea-
sures, aggregation for ranking, gaming and damaging morale (Table 1). The ﬁrst four of these
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Table 1. Six problems with star ratings
Type Description
Measuring Often the most important aspects of performance cannot be measured, and hence what is
what matters measured becomes important. School league tables based on examination results are an
exemplar as a proxy measure of teacher performance, because of the difﬁculty of
measuring the beneﬁts of education from teaching. The general problem, of creating
incentives for agents to respond to targets that omit key dimensions of performance, was
modelled by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), who showed that neither using a limited set
of good measures nor a larger set of poor measures would produce results that are free
from signiﬁcant distortion by gaming.
Selection There are problems in assessing performance of complex organizations in selecting what
ought to be included (and hence excluded) from the set of targets. For primary care
organizations in England, for example, it is difﬁcult to see a good rationale for the set of
about 50 targets and indicators used in star ratings to cover their complex set of
responsibilities (for providing primary and community health services, improving public
health and commissioning secondary care) (Bevan, 2006).
Nature of Performance indicators are often ‘tin openers’ rather than ‘dials’: ‘they do not give answers
measures but prompt investigation and inquiry, and by themselves provide an incomplete and
inaccurate picture’ (Carter et al., 1995).
Aggregation There are problems with methods of producing aggregate measures of performance for
for ranking ranking systems (Jacobs and Goddard, 2007). League tables have been shown to be
statistically unsound (Goldstein and Spiegelhalter, 1996; Marshall and
Spiegelhalter, 1998). One criterion in the design of the star rating system was to avoid
volatility from statistical noise in which there were substantial variations in performance
from one year to the next. But the methods of determining whether an organization was
three or two star were arcane (Klein, 2002), so complex that it was difﬁcult for an
organization to understand why its ranking had changed (Spiegelhalter, 2005a).
Gaming When targets have been backed by high powered incentives in response to success and
failure, a common effect has been gaming, both in centrally planned economies
(Nove, 1958; Berliner, 1988; Kornai, 1994) and in the public sector (Smith, 1995).
Morale Publicly reporting that hospitals were ‘failing’ (‘zero rated’ or one star) damaged the
morale of their staff (Horton, 2004; Mannion et al., 2005a,b).
ratings, which we see as consequences of any system that satisﬁes Judith Hibbard’s four requi-
sitecharacteristics,whichisdesignedtoinﬂictreputationaldamageonorganizationsperforming
poorly.
If tackling failure were to have been ruled out on the grounds of damaging morale, then pre-
sumablythenotoriousscandalsthatbesettheNHSinthelate1990swouldhavebeenallowedto
continue for even longer than they did (Bevan, 2008b). Any system that satisﬁes Hibbard’s four
requisite characteristics will damage morale of those identiﬁed as performing poorly. Indeed it
can be argued that damaging morale is necessary in the short term for creating the different
atmosphere that is required to achieve improvement in the long term. Because star ratings were
taken so seriously, they did encourage gaming, which was also a concern with the CSRS in New
York. There are two corollaries of this. First, if we were only to adopt systems of performance
measurement in which there were no incentive to game, these would be unlikely to be taken
seriously, and hence fail to provide the external discipline to drive improvement of government
services. Second, if we do take systems of performance measurement seriously, and design these
to have an effect, then developing systems to counter gaming ought to be integral to the design
of such systems.
The next section of this paper examines the effects of targets for ambulance response times
to emergency calls in the various UK countries. There are two reasons why this is particularlyHitting and Missing Targets by Ambulance Services 171
interesting. First, we have a natural experiment between different approaches to using perfor-
mance measurement: the category A 8-minute target was common to each UK country; but
only in England was this subject to a system of performance measurement with Hibbard’s req-
uisite characteristics to effect change through the reputation pathway. Approaches in the other
UK countries relied on the change pathway: that ambulance trusts would know how their
performance compared with the target and this alone would be enough to drive improvement.
Second, it seems so much easier to resolve the four statistical problems of star ratings that were
identiﬁedaboveforambulanceservicesthan,forexample,fororganizationsascomplexasacute
care hospitals. A target for rapid responses by ambulances to life threatening emergency calls
looks to be a good measure of what matters, as it reﬂects what we would expect ought to be a
principalgoalofthoseservices.Indeed,therationalefortheselectionofthecategoryA8-minute
target was that
‘Clinical evidence shows that achievement of the target could save as many as 1,800 lives each year in
people under 75 years suffering acute heart attacks’
(Healthcare Commission, 2005b). Furthermore, performance against this target requires only
data that ought to be collected routinely and appears to be easy to measure.
3. The effects of targets on ambulance response times in the various UK
countries
3.1. The development of targets and performance reporting
The NHS reorganization of 1974, which transferred responsibility for running ambulance ser-
vices from local authorities in England and Wales to the NHS, revealed variations in standards
for response times to emergency calls that lacked any good rationale. National standards that
were set in 1974 became common standards across the UK and essentially remained the same
for the next 20 years (based on an operational research consultancy study and hence known as
ORCON standards): 50% and 95% of emergency calls ought to be met within 7 and 14 minutes
inmetropolitanareas;within8and20minutesinotherareas(DepartmentofHealthandSocial
Security, 1974).
In England, following a review (National Health Service Executive, 1996), ambulance trusts
were required to introduce a system of prioritization of emergency calls into three categories:
A (may be immediately life threatening), B (serious but not immediately life threatening) and C
(neither immediately life threatening nor serious). For category A calls ambulance trusts were
set an ‘interim target’ of responding to 75% within 8 minutes by March 2001; for category
B and C calls, 95% were to be met within 14 minutes for ‘urban’ or 19 minutes for ‘rural’
trusts (Department of Health, 1999a). (Urban and rural trusts were deﬁned by whether the
population density was more or less than 2.5 people per acre (Department of Health, 2000).)
Performance against the new targets was reported publicly for each service as call prioriti-
zation was introduced from 1998–1999, and also within the star rating system from 2002 to
2005. Although the summary statistic for performance across England against the category A
8-minutetargetisreportedfrom2001–2002only(InformationCentre,2007),thiscanbederived
from annual statistics reported for the preceding years (Department of Health, 1999b, 2000,
2001).
In Wales, in April 1998, the Welsh Ambulance Trust was established, taking responsibility
for ambulance services across the whole country. From April 1999, the same target of meeting
75% of category A calls within 8 minutes was introduced for all areas in Wales. This was to be
achieved by the end of 2001, ‘with further progress thereafter’ (National Assembly for Wales,172 G. Bevan and R. Hamblin
2001). (Although there are differences in deﬁnition between England and Wales in what consti-
tutes an emergency call, the Auditor General for Wales (2006), page 35, analysed a sample of
471000 emergency calls and found that
‘there would have been only 0.6 per cent more Category ‘A’ calls in Wales had it applied the same call
categorisations as England’
and hence concluded that it was valid to compare performance in these countries.) Performance
was publicly reported for the Welsh Ambulance Service as a whole annually from April 1999,
and for three different services within Wales (Central and West, North and South East Wales)
quarterly from April 2001 (Auditor General for Wales, 2006). In contrast with England, failure
by the Welsh Ambulance Service to meet the category A 8-minute target resulted, not in public
censure, but in the imposition of successively less demanding ‘milestone’ targets being set for
the percentages of category A calls to be met within 8 minutes: from April 2004, the target was
reducedto65%(thethresholdforaserviceinEnglandtohavebeenzerorated);fromApril2005
to 60% (which remains as the target for 2008–2009, supplemented by targets for 70% to be met
within 9 minutes and 75% within 10 minutes) (Auditor General for Wales (2006), page 28, and
Welsh Assembly Government (2007a), page 34).
The governments in Northern Ireland and Scotland introduced the category A 8-minute tar-
get to be achieved from 2005 (Rooker, 2006) and by 2007–2008 (Scottish Ambulance Service,
2004). In neither country was this target given the prominence that it was in England. We have
been unable to ﬁnd performance being reported publicly by governments of either country
against that target on the Web sites of the Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency and
Information Services Division Scotland. Hence our principal sources for data on performance
inNorthernIrelandandScotland(whichwereportbelow)arefromothersources:forNorthern
Ireland, a written answer to a question in the Houses of Lords (Rooker, 2006); for Scotland,
from a report on the Welsh Ambulance Service, which compared the performance of the service
in Wales with services in England and Scotland (Auditor General for Wales (2006), page 37),
and Audit Scotland (2007).
3.2. Performance against targets
In England, star ratings for ambulance trusts included three targets for response times to emer-
gency calls from 2002 to 2005: two were key targets, and one was in the balanced scorecard.
The two key targets were that 75% and 95% of category A calls be met within 8 minutes and 14
or 19 minutes for urban or rural trusts. For the ﬁrst 4 years of star ratings, there was a target
in the balanced scorecard for category B and C calls to be met within 14 or 19 minutes. For the
last 6 months of the ﬁnal year of ratings, this was replaced by a third key target for category B
calls only to be met within 14 or 19 minutes. There was no target in star ratings for category B
and C calls to be met within 8 minutes. Table 2 gives information on the thresholds for the three
key targets for emergency calls in the last year of star ratings for these trusts to be deemed to be
‘underachieving’ and ‘signiﬁcantly underachieving’ against key targets, which resulted in two
andsixpenaltypoints;aservicewouldhavebeenzeroratedwithsixormorepenaltypoints,and
havebeenonestarwithfourpenaltypoints(HealthcareCommission,2005b).(Thesethresholds
were broadly consistent over the 5 years of star rating for category A calls.) The main challenge
fromstarratingwasmeetingthecategoryA8-minutetarget(theoldstandardhadrequired50%
of all emergency calls to be met within 7 or 8 minutes; the new key target required meeting 75%
of category A calls within 8 minutes). The implications of performance against targets in the
balancedscorecardwereunclearinadvance,as,untiltheﬁnalyearofstarratings,thisdepended
on relative performance against other trusts.Hitting and Missing Targets by Ambulance Services 173
Table 2. Ambulance targets and thresholds for 2004–2005†
Measure Type of Signiﬁcantly Underachieved Achieved
target underachieved (%) (%) (%)
75% category A calls met <8 min Key <65 65–74 >74
95% category A calls met <14 min Key <90 90–94 >94
(urban) and <19 min (rural)
75% category B and C calls met <8 min None —‡ —‡ —‡
95% category B and C calls met <14 min Key <80 80–92 >92
(urban) and <19 min (rural)
†Source: Healthcare Commission (2005c).
‡Not applicable.
30
45
60
75
90
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Fig. 1. Percentage of category A calls met within 8 minutes (2000–2005) (source: Department of Health
(2002b, 2004) (for 2000–2004) and Health and Social Care Information Centre (2005) (for 2005))
Table 3 shows how performance changed over time in England for the four standards from
2000–2001, when over 30 trusts had implemented call prioritization, to 2004–2005. Before the
introduction of star rating in 2002, few trusts had achieved the category A 8-minute target
(although all were supposed to have done so by the end of March 2001). The effects of star
ratings on performance for the subsequent years were different depending on the importance
of the target in determining that rating. For the two key targets for category A calls, there were
dramatic improvements against the 8-minute target, and some improvements against the 14- or
19-minutetarget.Forthetargetinthebalancedscorecard,fortheﬁrst3years,forcategoryBand
C calls, there was little improvement against the target for 14 or 19 minutes during this period.
When this ceased to be a target, for the ﬁrst 6 months of 2004–2005 there was a worsening in
performance. For category B and C calls within 8 minutes, there was no target in star ratings
and virtually no improvement. The clear message is that trusts improved reported performance
to avoid being classed as signiﬁcantly underachieving against key targets (for category A calls
less than 65% within 8 minutes and 90% within 14 or 19 minutes).
Fig.1givesperformancefortheyearsendinginMarchfrom2000to2005foreachof28trusts
(which were unaffected by mergers) and shows the transformation in reported performance in
England for meeting the category A 8-minute target, before star rating (for the years ending in
March 2000 and 2001), and after (for the years ending in March from 2002 to 2005). In the year
before star ratings, only three trusts achieved the category A 8-minute target; 17 met less than
65% of such calls (which, if maintained, would have resulted in a zero rating) and, of those 17,174 G. Bevan and R. Hamblin
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Fig. 2. Percentage of category A calls met within 8 minutes, in England (), Wales ( ) and Scotland
(4) (sources: England, Department of Health (1999a, 2000, 2001) (for 1999–2001) and Information Centre
(2007) (for 2002–2007); Wales, National Assembly for Wales (2005) (for 2000–2004), Auditor General for
Wales (2006), page 37 (for 2005 and 2006), and Welsh Assembly Government (2007b) (for 2007); Scotland,
Auditor General for Wales (2006), page 37, and Audit Scotland (2007), page 2 (for 2007))
ﬁve met less than 50% of such calls within 8 minutes (four of these were classed as rural, but the
worst, with only a 42% response rate, was the London Ambulance Service, which had suffered
from a catastrophic failure of a computer system in the early 1990s).
Toachievemoredemandingtargetsforresponsetimestoemergencycallswhenthesevaryand
areuncertain,itisobviouslynecessarytomanagesupplybettertomeetpeaksindemand.There
is limited information on how this was achieved by ambulance services in England. In Essex
new management implemented measures that improved staff morale and focused on changing
supply to achieve the key targets. This included developing out-of-hours care, developing emer-
gency care practitioners, improved stafﬁng and buying new emergency vehicles and equipment
(Bevington et al., 2004). The Auditor General for Wales (2006), page 104, argued that
‘despite the record of poor performance and of failures in key areas of business management in the
Welsh Ambulance Service, there were grounds for optimism’,
as other ambulance trusts in England had faced ‘somewhat similar situations but been able to
turn themselves round, given time’. The Auditor General for Wales (2006), pages 105–106, gave
two case-studies of such turnarounds in London and East Anglia Ambulance Trusts, which
were attributed to
‘sound planning, change management and budgeting, ... strong programme management, the need
to refresh plans, and the need to consider the management capacity required to support and maintain
change’.
The London Ambulance Service implemented a service improvement plan, which improved the
percentage of category A response times met within 8 minutes from 40% to 75.1%.
Fig. 2 gives performance (where data are available) for England, Wales and Scotland, from
1999–2000 to 2005–2006. This shows that the service in England achieved the 75% target on
average from 2003 (the reduction in 2006 is due to an adjustment to reﬂect concerns about
data recording in six English trusts—this is discussed below). The service in Wales, which has
achieved neither the 75% target set in 2001, nor the 65% target set in 2004 nor the 60% target set
in2005,wasthesubjectofadamningreportbytheAuditorGeneralforWales(2006)(seebelow).
Fig. 2 shows that, since 2004, the ambulance service in Scotland had a similar performance to
that of Wales, meeting less than 60% of category A calls within 8 minutes. The only information176 G. Bevan and R. Hamblin
that we have been able to ﬁnd on the performance of the service in Northern Ireland was that, in
2005–2006, this met 51% of category A calls within 8 minutes (Rooker, 2006). These standards
of performance seem to have had little resonance in either Scotland or Northern Ireland.
The failure to improve performance of the Welsh ambulance services was attributed by the
Auditor General for Wales (2006) to ‘problems of strategy, leadership, governance, process,
infrastructure and systems, people and culture’ (page 8). The reasons for the mismatch between
supply of, and demand for, services included inﬂexible shift patterns and deployment, inade-
quate supply of ambulances (due to failures in procurement of new ambulances, ambulances
being old with high failure rates and insufﬁcient spare ﬂeet capacity) and inadequate systems
(due to failures in procurement of new systems, failure to invest in satellite navigation and
problems with the radio network) (pages 14–15). There were, however, within Wales, signiﬁ-
cant variations in performance: the percentages of category A calls met within 8 minutes in
2005–2006 ranged from 70% to 40% (page 32). Some (but not all) of the poor performers served
a sparsely populated area, but the report found little evidence of attempts by those services
‘to mitigate these problems through seeking to develop new models of service delivery’. One
weakness of governance was the lack of benchmarking against other ambulance services (page
63). The report did this and found that the service in Wales had higher spend per capita than
rural services in England but worse performance (pages 54 and 36).
3.3. Problems of target selection
Pelletal.(2001)showedthatrapidresponsestoemergencycallsfollowingcardiacarrest(abrupt
cessationofthepumpfunctionoftheheartthatwithoutpromptinterventionwillleadtodeath)
was the best way of reducing mortality from coronary heart disease in the UK, which has been,
and despite recent improvements continues to be, relatively high. (Among developed countries,
only Ireland and Finland have a higher rate than the UK (Allender et al., 2006).) Pell et al.
(2001) emphasized that most deaths from cardiac arrest occurred out of hospital: about 75% of
alldeathsand91%ofpeopleunder55yearsofage.TheiranalysisofdatafromScotlandofcases
with cardiac arrests between 1991 and 1998, who had been seen within 14 minutes, found that
only 6% survived to hospital discharge. They estimated that, if these cases had been reached in
8 or 5 minutes, that percentage would have increased to between 8% and 10%. This study gives
a basis to the rationale for the selection of the category A 8-minute target: that
‘Clinical evidence shows that achievement of the target could save as many as 1,800 lives each year in
people under 75 years suffering acute heart attacks’
(Healthcare Commission, 2005b). There are, however, two problems in making this connec-
tion.
The ﬁrst is that the quicker the response the better, and Pell et al. (2001) emphasized advan-
tages of equipping other ﬁrst responders with ‘intelligent’ deﬁbrillators to provide cardiopul-
monary resuscitation in less than 8 minutes: such as ﬁreﬁghters (as the ﬁre service has many
more stations than the ambulance service and 90% of vehicles are required to attend the scene
of a ﬁre within 5 minutes), police or community volunteers. The second is the law that Charles
Goodhart proposed following his analysis of the failure of the UK Government’s reliance on
money supply targets in the 1980s to control inﬂation: ‘Any observed statistical regularity will
tend to collapse once pressure is placed on it for control purposes’ (Goodhart (1984), page 94).
Goodhart’s law means that, although statistical analysis of historical data may suggest a rela-
tionship between a target and an outcome, once the target is used, the people who generate the
data for the target may change their behaviour so the relationship breaks down. As we explain
below, gaming in response to the category A 8-minute target undermined the promised beneﬁtsHitting and Missing Targets by Ambulance Services 177
of its realization. As Heath and Radcliffe (2007) argued ‘assuming that more lives will be saved
if response targets are met is too simplistic’.
Onewayoftakingaccountofthebeneﬁtsofquickresponsetimesacrossdifferentservicesand
gaming would be to develop measures of performance, using Donabedian’s classic framework
for improving quality of care (Donabedian, 2005), in terms of structure, process and outcome.
Thissuggestsgenerating,inadditiontothecurrenttargetsofprocess,oneofstructure,theavail-
ability of deﬁbrillators in ambulances, and one of outcomes, return of spontaneous circulation
rates following cardiac arrest (as argued by Heath and Radcliffe (2007)). This would help to
countergaminginresponsetothecurrenttargetsforprocessonly:forexample,ifreturnofspon-
taneouscirculationratesdidnotincreaseinlinewithincreasesinresponsetimes,thiswouldraise
questionsabouthowthereportedincreaseinresponsetimeshadbeenachieved.Thiswouldalso
help to indicate the extent to which there was co-ordination across emergency services. Indeed
one of the government’s ambitions for performance measurement in England, through the sys-
tem that became star ratings (then described as ‘trafﬁc lights’), was to take account of the way
in which different organizations worked in partnership with others in performing on key shared
objectives across the local ‘health economy’ (Secretary of State for Health (2000), page 64). One
of the weaknesses of the star rating system was the way that it failed to do this: by assessing
differenthealthservicesseparately,thesystemencouragedoneservicetoachieveitsowntargets
bygamingevenifthisadverselyaffectedanother.(Anotoriousexamplewasthatsomehospitals
kept patients waiting in ambulances outside the hospital until the hospital could be conﬁdent
thatthepatientcouldbeseeninitsaccidentandemergencydepartmentwithinthe4-hourtarget
(Commission for Health Improvement, 2004b).)
3.4. Problems of target deﬁnition
The ofﬁcial deﬁnitions in timing ambulance responses were that the clock ought to start when
detailsofthetelephonecallhadbeenascertainedandstopwhentheemergencyresponsevehicle,
dispatched by, and accountable to, the ambulance service, arrived at the scene of the incident.
(Thiscouldincludeaparamediconamotorbikeorinacaroranapproved‘ﬁrstresponder’who
was not employed by the ambulance service, such as a doctor, policeman or ﬁreman (Depart-
ment of Health, 1999b, 2000).) In practice, however, there were troubling variations in the
recording of response times (Commission for Health Improvement, 2003c). The deﬁnition of
what constituted a category A call was left to local discretion, which resulted in ﬁvefold varia-
tion across trusts in the percentages of emergency calls that were classiﬁed as category A. This
variation persisted from 2001 to 2005. Such extreme disparities must have meant that differ-
ent trusts consistently made different judgements over what did, and did not, constitute a life
threatening emergency. The Commission for Health Improvement (2003c) recommended that
these problems of deﬁnition be tackled by detailed analysis of the various approaches to cat-
egorization. The ambiguity over deﬁnition of category A calls raises a fundamental question
about the achievement of the 8-minute target.
3.5. Gaming in England
The problems that we have identiﬁed in deﬁnition and recording were raised in evidence in 2002
to the House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee (2002) and obviously pre-
sented opportunities for gaming. We discuss three sets of problems here, identiﬁed in the CHI’s
clinical governance reviews (Commission for Health Improvement, 2003c): consequences of the
intense focus on the category A 8-minute target, deﬁnition of category A calls and manual
‘correction’ of response times.178 G. Bevan and R. Hamblin
The intense focus on the category A 8-minute target gave rise to three concerns. First,
as urgent calls for an ambulance from general practitioners for patients were not classed as
category A, they could be given lower priority. Second, a common view was that ‘to get there
in 8.01 minutes and save the patient is seen as a failure’ (Commission for Health Improvement
(2003c), page 9). Third, it was alleged that some trusts concentrated ambulances in densely
populated areas (where the bulk of calls could be reached within 8 minutes) at the expense of
patients in rural areas. This logical response to the category A 8-minute target is a vivid illus-
tration of a trade-off between efﬁciency (meeting as many calls as possible within 8 minutes)
and equity (that access depends on need and not where people live). But we doubt whether
those who framed this policy would have regarded such relocations as an acceptable response.
(Although a limit set was on how much worse performance could be for calls that took longer
than 8 minutes, as another key target was that 95% of category A calls receive a response within
14 minutes or 19 minutes for urban or rural trusts.)
Staff at many ambulance trusts alleged that there had been exploitation of the ambiguity
over the deﬁnitions of category A calls to game the system: by classifying incidents as category
A if the control room believed that they could be met in 8 minutes, and category B and C if
not, or through selectively reclassifying calls following the conclusion of the incident. The CHI,
however, found hard evidence that this had occurred once only (which resulted in this practice
being stopped (Commission for Health Improvement (2003c), page 15)).
The CHI found out that, in one service, the times of responses taking longer than 8 minutes
had been ‘corrected’ to be recorded as taking less than 8 minutes. This was mainly because tar-
getscreatedacultureinwhichstafffeltunderpressuretorecordthe‘right’answer.Asubsequent
reanalysisofallEnglishambulanceservicedatashowedthatsuchmanual‘corrections’hadbeen
undertakeninaroundathirdoftrusts.Thisinvestigationconcentratedonthefrequencydistribu-
tionsofresponsetimesandidentiﬁedoddlyshapedfrequencydistributionsthatexhibitedsharp
discontinuities around the 8-minute target (Commission for Health Improvement, 2003c,d).
Fig. 3 gives the expected (‘uncorrected’) distribution from one service: of a ‘noisy’ decline in
numbers of responses over time with no obvious jump around the 8-minute target. Figs 4, 5, 6,
7 and 8 are examples from different trusts of different types of ‘corrections’: Fig. 4 shows a mar-
ginaldiscontinuity,whichbecomesmoremarkedinFigs5and6;Fig.7hasadramaticspikeat8
minutes.Ineachofthesethereisaclearimplicationthatcallsjustover8minuteswerereassigned
to give a response time of 8 minutes or less. Fig. 8 shows a spike at each minute; in this case
Fig. 3. Example of a ‘noisy’decline in response times to category A calls by one service (source: Commis-
sion for Health Improvement (2003c))Hitting and Missing Targets by Ambulance Services 179
Fig. 4. Marginal discontinuity in frequency of response times to category A calls by one service (source:
Commission for Health Improvement (2003c))
Fig. 5. Slope in frequency of response times to category A calls around 8 minutes by one service (source:
Commission for Health Improvement (2003c))
Fig. 6. Bulge in frequency of response times to category A calls around 8 minutes by one service (source:
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Fig. 7. Spike in frequency of response times to category A calls at 8 minutes by one service (source:
Commission for Health Improvement (2003c))
Fig. 8. Spikes in frequency of response times to category A calls at each minute by one service (source:
Commission for Health Improvement (2003c))
the problem was not one of gaming, but such poor data recording systems that for a signiﬁcant
proportion of calls manual entries were recorded to the nearest minute. The CHI estimated,
however, that the effect of the most dramatic corrections would have improved performance by
at most 6%; hence star ratings did produce substantial improvements in performance against
the category A 8-minute target (of up to 20% since 1999).
For trusts where there was a clear discontinuity at precisely 8 minutes for category A calls,
the CHI undertook statistical tests to determine the extent of the discontinuity by performing
a weighted regression of the count of category A calls on the response times (weighted by the
number of calls), for the data from 7:01 minutes to 8:00 minutes. Using the results from the
regression analysis, the total number of predicted calls between 8:01 minutes and 9:00 minutes
was compared with the actual number of calls recorded in the same time period. In the majority
of cases where discontinuity was judged signiﬁcant, the actual calls met between 8:01 minutes
and 9:00 minutes fell outside the 95% prediction interval.
4. Discussion
In this discussion we begin by considering troubling questions for governments in the UK that
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response times. We then consider recommendations on the development of, and research into,
systems of performance measurement by the Royal Statistical Society (Bird et al., 2005).
4.1. Ambulance response times in UK countries
TheUKhad,andcontinuestohave,highmortalityfromcoronaryheartdisease,whichcouldbe
reduced by rapid responses to cardiac arrests by emergency services. This offers a rationale for
the target that 75% of category A calls be met within 8 minutes for ambulance services, which
has been proposed for each UK country. Only in England, however, has that target been met:
onaverage,ineachoftheothercountriesintheUK,lessthan60%ofcategoryAcallshavebeen
met within 8 minutes. So, if those services were to have been subjected to the English system
of star rating, they would have been zero rated and publicly named as failing. At ﬁrst sight it
seems bizarre that devolution has allowed very different approaches to performance manage-
ment,whichhaveresultedinsuchmarkeddifferencesinperformancebetweentheUKcountries
against a target, which is held in common, and relates to a vital emergency service, and where
failure to meet it may mean that lives are being lost. One explanation was suggested by Hood
(2007), page 97, who has argued that the larger scale of England creates a greater degree of
relational distance between governments and providers of public services than in Scotland and
Wales, where there are ‘smaller societies with more tightly-linked and overlapping political and
social elites’. Bevan (2008a) suggested that this explains their reluctance to introduce systems of
performancemeasurementthatinﬂictreputationaldamageonpoorperformers.Alvarez-Rosete
et al. (2005) showed that differences in performance of NHSs of the various UK countries were
not caused by differences in aggregate levels of funding. So is variation in response times to
the category A 8-minute target another example of the price of devolution being to condemn
populations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland to underperforming public services?
Alvarez-Rosete et al. (2005) highlighted problems, following devolution, in ﬁnding consistent
data across each country for the most basic comparisons. After 2003, for example, the Ofﬁce
for National Statistics stopped publishing information on hospital waiting times across the
UK (Ofﬁce for National Statistics, 2004). As we have made clear, we have found it difﬁcult to
compare performance of ambulance services across the UK. It seems to us essential that the
Ofﬁce for National Statistics (or some other body with similar authority and independence) is
empowered to specify and collect basic comparative data on health care and to publish these
so that people in each country are aware of the differences emerging through devolution. This
would require each country to publish data that are comparable with those for England on
performance of ambulance response times. Such requirements might inﬂict the necessary repu-
tational damage on ambulance services and governments to encourage them to remedy serious
underperformance.
Another set of questions is raised by variations in responses to, and the timing of, the setting
of the category A 8-minute target. Why did continued failure of the service in Wales to achieve
that target result in successively less demanding milestone targets being set? Why did it take
so long for there to be a thorough investigation of that service found to have been wanting in
all key elements of management? Why has a similarly dismal level of performance in Northern
Ireland and Scotland not resulted in similar concerns? It may be argued that the answer to that
question is that the category A 8-minute target was only set in those countries to be achieved
later(2005and2007),whereasinEnglandandWalesthiswasintendedtobeachievedfrom2001.
But that only prompts an even more troubling question: if it seemed a good idea to introduce
this in England and Wales in 1996 to be achieved in 2001, as a way of ‘saving lives’, why did it
makesensetodelayrequiringitsachievementuntil4and6yearslaterinScotlandandNorthern
Ireland?Inparticular,areportbytheComptrollerandAuditorGeneral(NationalAuditOfﬁce,182 G. Bevan and R. Hamblin
1999) made similar criticisms about performance of the ambulance service in Scotland to that
made of the service in Wales: in terms of failure to meet the target that then applied in Scotland
(in Glasgow only one in three ambulances responded to an emergency call, within 7 minutes,
against a target of one in two), because supply did not match peaks in demand.
In England, until 2001, performance of ambulance services fell well short of the category A
8-minute target. After the star rating system applied to ambulance services from 2002, these
trusts responded to produce improvements in their reported performance for the key targets of
the star rating system, in particular the category A 8-minute target; but they did not improve
their reported performance for a standard that was excluded from that system, namely meeting
category B and C calls met within 8 minutes. There are, however, questions over the extent to
which hitting the category A 8-minute target translates into commensurate improvements in
outcomes, because of concerns over the selection of that target and its vulnerability to gaming.
The striking evidence of gaming in the manual recording of response times appears to be less
troubling than other concerns over deﬁnitions of what constituted a life threatening emergency
(category A) call, and when the clock started and stopped for responses to these calls. These
problems were raised in evidence in 2002 to the House of Commons Public Administration
Select Committee (2002). Why was nothing done to address them within the star rating system,
by,forexample,developing,inadditiontothesemeasuresofprocessinresponsetimes,measures
of structure (availability of deﬁbrillators) and outcome (return of spontaneous circulation)? We
are delighted to see that the proposed new national target indicators for ambulance trusts in
England that were proposed by the Healthcare Commission (2007) for 2007–2008 are directed
at auditing outcomes including those for cardiac arrest.
In 2005, the Healthcare Commission published the ﬁnal set of star ratings of ambulance
trusts,andtheDepartmentofHealth(2005)areportonambulanceservicesinEngland,follow-
ing a strategic review. That report recommended that there be only two national response time
requirements for category A calls only, that 75% be met within 8 minutes and 95% within 19
minutes; performance requirements for responding to patients whose general practitioner calls
999 on their behalf should be the same as for other 999 calls. The report asserted that only 10%
of all emergency calls were for life threatening emergencies and changed the deﬁnition of the
start of the clock to when the emergency call is connected to the ambulance control room. Why
didthereport,however,neitherclarifyambiguityoverdeﬁnitionoflifethreateningemergencies
nor recommend scrutiny to counter gaming?
In 2006, after whistle-blowers at one trust contacted the NHS counter-fraud service, the
Department of Health reported that an audit had found that six out of 31 trusts had failed
accurately to record the actual response times to the most serious life threatening emergency
call with a disturbingly familiar identiﬁcation of well-known weaknesses (Carvel, 2006):
‘Some did not start the clock as soon as a 999 call was received. Others did not synchronise the clocks
on the emergency switchboard with those used by paramedics. In some cases, ambulance organisations
recategorisedtheurgencyofthecallafterthejobwasdonetomakeitﬁttheresponsetimeachievedrather
than the priority given when the original call was made. This would have allowed staff to downgrade
an emergency if the ambulance arrived late.’
In 2007, the Audit Commission (2007) issued a public interest report on the former Wiltshire
Ambulance Service NHS Trust, following an audit. The report found, between April 2005 and
July 2006, that control room staff had manually changed response times for nearly 600 category
A and nearly 90 category B calls. The report (page 13) pointed out that
‘In a culture where managers’ jobs depend on achieving speciﬁc targets, there will be pressure to meet
those targets. If a system is properly managed, it can be used to monitor and improve performance as aHitting and Missing Targets by Ambulance Services 183
whole. But, a system can also be used to manipulate the data, rather than changing the way the service
is delivered. Data that is easy to manipulate gives people both the motive and opportunity to do so.’
This behaviour was noted up to 3 years after the CHI report into precisely this type of manip-
ulation had found the Wiltshire Ambulance Service to be one of the worst offenders, and after
at least two changes in leadership. So the apparent success of ambulance trusts in England in
meeting the category A 8-minute target is tarnished by the failure to design systems to tackle
gaming identiﬁed as a problem in 2002. The failure to tackle gaming in response to targets from
the outset was a general weakness of the star rating system (Bevan and Hood, 2006a) and of the
Blairite regime of performance measurement (Hood, 2006). Why was so little done in England
to tackle such persistent problems once these became so obvious for ambulance services: is this
the most insidious form of gaming in which improvement in reported performance was seen
as the prerequisite, regardless of what was actually happening? In the chapter in which Barber
(2007), pages 264–287, reviewed the effect of the Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit, he consid-
ered Riddell’s observation about the Blair government having been given insufﬁcient credit for
ﬁrmly based achievements in improving public services (Riddell, 2005). Now it seems to us
that a good reason for this was that the evidence of gaming, and failure to tackle this gaming,
underminedthecredibilityofimprovementsinreportedperformance.Tooursurprisethisisnot
even considered by Barber in that chapter.
4.2. General lessons from the case-study
The Royal Statistical Society’s working party (Bird et al. (2005), page 4) sought to
‘present a practical perspective on performance measurement that can help to resolve critical issues in
the design, analysis and reporting of performance indicators in the public services’.
Two of these concerned the need for consideration of ethical issues, and research into robust
methods for evaluating new government policies. We summarize the other recommendations as
follows, that systems of performance measurement need:
(a) to be evaluated to show that their beneﬁts outweigh their burden;
(b) research into relative merits of different dissemination strategies for the public release of
data;
(c) substantial input from individuals and/or institutions being monitored;
(d) a wide-ranging educational effort about the role and interpretation of data;
(e) to take account of variations and uncertainty;
(f) adetailedprotocol,clearlyspeciﬁedobjectives,cleardeﬁnitionofperformanceindicators
and methodological rigour;
(g) to be designed so that counterproductive behaviour is discouraged and subject to inde-
pendent scrutiny.
We strongly support the ﬁrst recommendation. Developments in computing have resulted in
a growth industry in performance measurement of health services. Little of this vast activity
has been evaluated and, where it has, the typical ﬁnding is that, because they were designed
for the change or selection pathways, they have had little or no effect. We would pose the ﬁrst
recommendation more urgently starkly and simply to emphasize the importance of ﬁnding out
whether a system of performance measurement has any discernible effect. It seems to us that
there has been a tendency in criticisms of the Blairite regime of performance measurement to
overlook one of its most important characteristics, namely that this regime had an effect, in
contrast with many others that seem to have provided only employment for those who produce
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Hibbard et al. (2003) proposed the importance of a third pathway through which a system
of performance measurement can have an inﬂuence, namely the reputation pathway. She has
also identiﬁed four requisite characteristics of a system to have an effect in this way: that it
be a ranking system, published and widely disseminated, easily understood by the public and
followed up by future reports. This paper has summarized evidence to test that hypothesis from
three comparisons of systems of hospital performance measurement. The systems that satisﬁed
all or most of those requisite characteristics did have an effect, and those that did not failed to
do so. These studies, and other evidence, suggest that the key driver in the systems that did have
an effect were what Mannion and Davies (2002) identiﬁed as the ‘softer issues’: not ﬁnance, but
‘reputation,statusandprofessionalpride’.Inparticulartheoverridingconcernwasthedamage
to reputations from providers publicly ‘named and shamed’ as being the worst performers. This
paper gives another test of that hypothesis of performance in a natural experiment: different
countriesoftheUKhaveadopteddifferentsystemsofperformancemeasurementofambulance
services against the common category A 8-minute target. Only in England was there a system
that satisﬁed Judith Hibbard’s four requisite characteristics, and only there has this target been
achieved. We see these requisite characteristics, and evidence from systems that do and do not
satisfy them, as giving a new perspective on the other six recommendations.
The second recommendation concerns research. We see the need for more research directed
at testing the hypothesis proposed by Hibbard et al. (2003), and the implication that, to have an
effect, systems need to be designed to inﬂict reputational damage on those which are shown to
be performing poorly. In particular, for the English system of star ratings, research is needed:
to assess the importance in that system of reputational damage and threats to the jobs of chief
executives of NHS trusts; of how organizations transformed their capacity to match supply to
variableanduncertaindemandsinreducinghospitalwaitingtimesforadmissionandambulance
response times to emergency calls. The third recommendation (on substantial input from those
being monitored) conceals a potential threat to effective systems of performance measurement:
as Hibbard et al. (2003) observed
‘providers will vigorously oppose an approach that explicitly ranks or identiﬁes top and bottom per-
formers. However, it may be this very strategy that makes the difference between motivation to improve
and no motivation.’
The fourth recommendation calls for ‘a wide-ranging educational effort about the role and
interpretation of data’. We would instead recast the ﬁfth and sixth recommendations, on statis-
tical developments in performance measurement, as requiring those that are statistically sound
but can be easily understood by the public, e.g. Spiegelhalter’s development of funnel plots as
a way of understanding variation (Spiegelhalter, 2005b). A particularly challenging problem is
the development of sound systems of aggregation to produce a ranking of performance. Our
study of targeting ambulance response times demonstrates the importance of the sixth and
seventh recommendations: the need for clearly deﬁned targets; detailed protocols for report-
ing of data on performance; assessment designed to discourage counterproductive behaviour;
independent scrutiny of reported performance to achieve proper accountability and to provide
a check on counterproductive behaviours. In conclusion we emphasize that what matters in
designing systems that will have an effect is to make countering gaming integral to that design.
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